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Abstract 
Research question: In 2010, the governing body of European football, UEFA, approved 
“Financial Fair Play” regulations.  Designed to encourage financial discipline, promote stability 
and foster competitive balance, they focus on a financial breakeven constraint. We analyse the 
impact of such constraints on the joint sporting and financial efficiency of English football 
clubs.   
Research methods: The simultaneous production of both sporting and financial outputs are 
modelled using stochastic, non-parametric efficiency analysis.  The sample is an unbalanced 
panel representing 60 clubs spanning the 2003/2004 to 2016/2017 seasons.   
Results and Findings: The Financial Fair Play breakeven regulation reduces average club 
efficiency, raises the relative importance of financial goals (capturing revenue share) whilst 
lowering the relative importance of sporting goals (capturing point share). The efficiency costs 
of regulation are not borne equally by clubs. 
Implications: Breakeven regulations reduce the joint sporting and financial efficiency of 
regulated clubs, with the efficiency loss positively related to the severity of the breakeven 
constraint. The Financial Fair Play regulations further entrench the financial and sporting 
power of elite clubs and potentially undermine league competitive intensity by shifting the 
relative focus of clubs away from sporting productivity toward financial productivity.     
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Introduction 
In 2010, against a backdrop of widespread financial instability in professional football, UEFA 
(Union of European Football Associations) announced a revised regulatory framework for 
clubs in its member nations.  Subsequently adapted by domestic league competitions, 
‘Financial Fair Play’ (FFP) regulations centre on a financial breakeven constraint.  Loss making 
clubs must ensure that they do not breach the regular FFP loss threshold.  If they do, they may 
up to a maximum allowable loss; cover the excess by owner equity injection. Breaching the 
regular loss level without owner equity injection or breaching the maximum allowable loss 
results in censures, which may be financial, sporting (prohibition from competing in European 
club competitions) or a combination of both. 
The regulations have been divisive.  Proponents argue that the constraint enforces 
financial discipline, incentivises diversification of revenue streams and engenders competitive 
balance.  Opponents argue that it is an inefficient means of moderating expenditure, reduces 
investment in the sport, potentially violates European labour and competition law and 
entrenches the financial and sporting standing of Europe’s elite clubs.  
 This study investigates the impact of FFP’s breakeven constraint on the joint financial 
and sporting efficiency of English football clubs.  The sample is drawn from the top two tiers 
of English professional football – the Premier League and the Championship from 2003 to 
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2017.  We analyse the trade-off between economic and sporting goals and detail how aspects 
of the operating environment (such as competing in European competitions, promotion, 
relegation, stadium utilisation, commercial independence and manager turnover) impact 
relative club efficiency.   
The results suggest that breakeven constraints reduce average club efficiency, raise the 
relative importance of financial goals (i.e. capturing a larger share of the total revenue produced 
by all clubs in a given league tier, in a given season) whilst lowering the relative importance 
of sporting goals (i.e. capturing a larger share of the total points earned by all clubs in a given 
league tier, in a given season). Each trend is exacerbated by the degree of regulatory severity.  
The decline in efficiency is less marked for those clubs which are viewed as elite and thus 
politically powerful.   
It is argued that pushing for promotion and competing in the Champions League 
significantly reduce efficiency and more-so as the degree of regulatory severity increases.  
Clubs which are less reliant on central distributions (from the Premier League, Championship 
and UEFA) are significantly more efficient and the importance of this commercial 
independence increases as the breakeven regulations tighten.  Clubs which have higher rates of 
stadium utilisation (i.e. higher average attendances as a proportion of stadium capacity) are 
more efficient. Managerial change is associated with a contemporaneous decline in efficiency, 
albeit of marginal statistical significance.  In the season post change, clubs are significantly 
more efficient, with the efficiency gains largely increasing with regulatory severity. 
 The work contributes to the literature on the economics of regulation. The results are 
suggestive of private interest theory of regulation and the related concept of regulatory capture 
(Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971). FFP’s breakeven constraint serves to widen the 
efficiency gap between those at the top and bottom of the efficiency distribution. The efficiency 
costs of regulation are not borne equally by clubs.  This serves to further entrench the financial 
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and competitive positions of the elite and politically powerful clubs (Szymanski, 2014), many 
of whom established commercial and sporting dynasties in the pre FFP era. 
The study also contributes to the literature on the unintended consequences1 of 
regulation (Averch & Johnson, 1962; Merton, 1936; Spatt, 2006; Stigler, 1971). The findings 
suggest that the FFP regulations on-balance reduce the average club’s efficiency whilst 
simultaneously shifting the relative importance of priorities from sporting (capturing point 
share) to financial (capturing revenue share).   Although the increased financial focus may be 
viewed as an intended goal, the extent of the decline in the relative importance of sporting 
performance is unintended and may lead to an overall decline in the sporting quality of the 
league2.  
This study also contributes to the literature on professional club management (by clubs 
and regulators) and has profound implications for those who administer and operate under 
break-even based regulatory regimes.  It is argued that if a club strives to be efficient, the 
greater the degree of regulatory severity the more the club should devote resources to capturing 
revenue share over point share. It is suggested that time and resource would be more 
productively employed in developing new club specific commercial deals rather than investing 
in playing talent.  It is argued that club efficiency benefits from more intensive stadium capacity 
utilisation, a suggestion more relevant to Championship clubs who have greater degrees of 
                                                     
1 These unintended consequences can stem from many sources: human error; the inability to model complex 
interactions amongst regulated actors; the ‘imperious immediacy’ of a single regulatory interest to the detriment 
of all others. 
2 Akerlof (1976) notes that competitive sporting leagues have a ‘rat race’ structure where teams compete for 
mutually exclusive ranking.  By placing budget constraints on clubs, the regulations reduce the market-clearing 
price of playing talent (Budzinski (2014) and Szymanski (2014)). Given the close link between playing talent and 
sporting production, budget constraints reduce the market clearing price of attaining a given league position.  
Wage constraints are not necessarily met by a reduction in the supply of football talent given its relative inelasticity 
to player wages.  In the face of a relatively static pool of footballing talent, the primary channel for declines in 
sporting efficiency relate to declines in player productivity. If wage falls undermine player productivity 
significantly it is reasonable to assert that the quality of the competitive product should decline commensurately. 
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capacity slack. It is noted that management change has the power to increase efficiency, but 
any discernible impact is detectable in the season post managerial change. 
The FFP Regulations 
The original guidance on UEFA’s FFP regulations was published in 2010 with sanctions for 
noncompliance effective from the end of the 2013/14 season.  The break-even requirement 
states that clubs have an allowable deviation (loss) of €5m from break-even assessed over a 
three-year rolling window.  Subject to owner equity injections covering the excess loss, clubs 
were permitted to breach the €5m limit up to a maximum allowable loss level of €45m.  This 
was subsequently revised down to €30m in the 2015/16 season.  As well as the break-even 
requirement a second condition known as the payables requirement prohibits clubs from having 
overdue creditors. 
For FFP, break-even is defined as relevant income minus relevant expenditure.  
Relevant income captures the primary sources of footballing revenue: gate receipts, 
broadcasting rights, sponsorship, advertising, other commercial activities plus profits from 
disposal of player registrations.  The relevant expenditure category includes cost of sales, 
employee benefit expenses and other operating expenses, plus either amortisation or costs of 
acquiring player registrations, finance costs and dividends.  Relevant expenses exclude items 
such as expenditure on youth development activities, women’s football (from 2015), 
expenditure on community development and finance costs directly attributable to the 
construction of tangible fixed assets.   
In February 2013 at the Premier League shareholders meeting, member clubs agreed a 
regulatory framework3 similar in structure to UEFA’s FFP regulations.  Firstly, clubs were 
                                                     
3 By March 2014, clubs were required to submit financial information in compliance with the updated regulatory 
code. The first break-even decisions were taken at the end of the first three-season year rolling window (in 
Summer 2016). 
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allowed to deviate from break-even (i.e. lose) £15m over a three year rolling window.  Losses 
in excess of this amount up to a total loss of £105m were permitted subject to owner equity 
injection of the excess. In addition, to control for short run cost increases,  clubs are  limited in 
raising wage bills (inclusive of player image rights) by £4m per season unless they can 
demonstrate contemporaneous revenue uplift (excluding central distributions from the Premier 
League itself) to cover the balance. 
In the Championship (the second tier of English professional football), beginning in 
2012/13 clubs faced an acceptable deviation from break-even of £3m per year, or up to £8m if 
the excess was covered by owner equity injection. In the 2015/16 season the regulation further 
harmonised with the UEFA and Premier League by assessing over a three year rolling period 
rather than annually.  Over this window clubs are permitted to lose £15m without a mandatory 
equity injection or up to £39m if equity is injected to cover the excess loss over £15m4. To 
summarise European and domestic FFP thresholds are currently set at the following levels: 
<<<Table 1 Here>>> 
Literature Review: Analysis of FFP Regulations 
Budzinski (2018) argues that agency problems can create incentives whereby regulators pursue 
goals other than those in direct benefit of all teams. Given that FFP regulations are a major 
extension of power of UEFA, the Premier League and the Football League, a spirited debate 
has arisen on their intent and structure. 
Proponents cite several key reasons for their necessity. Müller, Lammert, and 
Hovemann (2012) note that most professional leagues are structured in a ‘rat race’ framework 
where clubs compete for mutually exclusive ranking.  In the pursuit of perceived ‘jackpot’ 
                                                     
4 Given that losses are calculated on the basis of three year averages, clubs that have been relegated from the 
Premier League during the time period can use the maximum allowable Premier League loss (£105m/3=£35m a 
season including owner equity injection) for those seasons in which they played in the top flight. 
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outcomes they overinvest to the detriment of profitability. Franck (2014) notes that due to 
systematic overinvestment many clubs are de-facto insolvent, kept afloat only by cash 
injections from wealthy benefactors. This creates a soft budget constraint, suboptimal 
management behaviour and inefficient resource allocation.  Franck & Lang (2013) argue that 
such clubs undertake riskier investments and are inherently more unstable. Budzinski and 
Muller (2013) note that some prominent clubs in the largest European markets could be 
considered ‘too prominent to fail’.  Franck (2014) argues that public funding may be required 
to bailout clubs of this nature.  To the extent that FFP regulations harden club budget 
constraints, proponents argue that they reduce the capacity for overinvestment, lower the 
likelihood of club financial distress and help mitigate moral hazard inherent with being ‘too 
prominent to fail’.   
Franck (2014) argues that imposition of budget constraints promote efficient and 
effective management practice leading to a rise in the average level of (sporting and financial) 
management quality in the league. Müller et al. (2012) note that FFP effectively limits the 
capacity for “financial doping” by wealthy benefactors to the benefit of league integrity which 
is considered a bedrock of sporting competition.   
Many commentators have criticised the structure and underlying intent of the FFP 
regulations.  Several authors (e,g. Maxcy (2014), Szymanski (2014) and Sass (2016)) note that 
FFP effectively creates a barrier to entry for potential owners.  This serves to maintain the 
status quo i.e. the competitive positions of those clubs whose dynasties were established in the 
pre-FFP era.  
Szymanski (2014) argues that FFP may serve to reduce investment in the European 
game to the detriment of fan experience. It is noted that the size of commercial deals, attendance 
and global attention on the European game have increasingly significantly over a period in 
which financial and competitive inequality at clubs has risen.  Moreover, the assertion that 
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wealthy benefactors are an unsustainable funding source for clubs is challenged on the basis 
that the number and variety of benefactors continues to rise over time.  Several critics document 
that FFP regulations in their current form transfer economic rents from players to club owners.  
Revenue related caps on player expenditure reduce the market-clearing price of playing talent.  
The beneficiaries are owners, most prominently those of the highest status clubs with the largest 
wage bills.  Several researchers question whether this transfer of rents is in adherence with EU 
law.  Budzinski (2014) and Szymanski (2014) point to the inequality engendered by the FFP 
regulations and a recent court challenge by player agents on the grounds of restriction on 
investments of owners, deflation of player salaries and fossilisation of market structure.  
FFP monitoring costs are identified as a significant concern (Vöpel, 2011).  The FFP 
regulations class certain forms of income and expenditure as “relevant” in the breakeven 
calculation. Classification shifting, and creative accounting have the potential to undermine the 
goals of FFP (Budzinski, 2014).  The monitoring of related party transactions require detailed 
scrutiny to assess whether commercial deals are signed at “fair market value”.    If the FFP 
regulations are to be viewed as credible, regulatory arbitrage schemes should be monitored 
closely, and sanctions applied judiciously. Müller et al. (2012) raise some concerns in this 
regard and claim that sanctions for violation of FFP lack ex-ante clarity thus undermining their 
credibility.   
Empirical Methodology 
Team performance is measured relative to an efficient production frontier. In the context of 
English football, efficiency analysis has been applied using two competing paradigms - Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Barros & Leach, 2006b; Guzmán & Morrow, 2007; Haas, 2003) 
and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) (Barros & Garcia-del-Barrio, 2008; Barros & Leach, 
2007; Carmichael, McHale, & Thomas, 2011; Dawson, Dobson, & Gerrard, 2000b).  DEA 
sacrifices the modelling of noise for the ability to impose axiomatic properties and estimate the 
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frontier non-parametrically. SFA sacrifices the imposing of axiomatic properties for the benefit 
of modelling inefficiency and noise (Johnson, Kuosmanen & Sasstamoinen, 2015).  In this 
study the innovative StoNEZD (Kuosmanen & Johnson, 2009; Johnson et al., 2015) approach 
is used to estimate club efficiency. It combines desirable aspects of both DEA and SFA: no 
functional form need be specified ex-ante, yet it also facilitates the modelling of noise via semi 
non-parametric estimation.    
The Model 
Neoclassical theories of the firm are inadequate for understanding the economic behaviour of 
football teams where success is measured in both sporting and financial terms. Evidence is 
mixed regarding the relative importance of these dimensions. Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski  
(2009) argue that football can be characterised as win maximising, subject to a zero profit 
budget constraint5. Carmichael and Thomas (2014) argue that top flight teams primarily strive 
for league survival and then a dominant domestic league position.  The former enables 
continuing receipt of significant broadcasting revenue, while the latter provides access to 
lucrative continental club competition revenue. Peeters and Szymanski (2014) opine that 
football is a heterogeneous mix of wealth and win maximising motives. 
Football teams compete for on-field success but can cooperate for off-field (financial) 
success (Garcia-del-Barrio & Szymanski, 2009), with competition characterising on-field 
success as a zero-sum game.  Tullock (1980) captures these unique aspects of production in 
sport using a model where playing success is driven by the relative share of resources 
employed. Team production is modelled as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) × ℎ(𝑧𝑖𝑡) × 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜖𝑖𝑡) (1) 
                                                     
5 They suggest this finding may be an artefact of the period of investigation, where intense competition for 
broadcasting and media exposure meant clubs where achieving a dominant sporting position to achieve higher 
profits in the longer term.   
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This cost function defines the minimum cost for providing outputs Revenue Share (RevShareit), 
and Points Share (PtsShareit).  Cost Shareit is the total variable cost of club i in season t. C(.) 
is non-parametric, h(.) is parametric, and εit= uit+vit, is a composite error term that combines 
inefficiency (uit) and noise (vit). The model is intertemporal as the function C(.) is applied over 
all seasons in the panel (Tulkens & Vanden Eeckaut, 1995).  The zit vector captures the 
operating environment of the club and is also used to impose hypothetical retrospective FFP 
regulatory conditions.     
Importantly, no functional form is imposed on C(.); rather a more relaxed set of 
axiomatic assumptions are used which assume C is monotonic, convex , and exhibits constant 
returns to scale6.  Equation 2 is estimated using the innovative StoNEZD approach which 
solves: 
min
𝛾𝛽𝜃?̃?
∑ ∑ 𝜖?̃?𝑡
2
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
  
subject to:  
(2) 
 
ln(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) = ln(𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖?̃?𝑡 
 
𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑗𝑘𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗𝑘𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  
 
𝛽1𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽2𝑖𝑡, 𝜃𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0 
 
𝑖 = (1, … , 𝐼)   𝑡 = (1, … , 𝑇)  𝑗 = (1, … , 𝐼), 𝑘 = (1, … , 𝑇 ) 
 
 
This is a least squares regression written as a nonlinear mathematical programming 
problem.  The first equality allows for the shadow price estimates (β1it, β2it, θit) to vary across 
both club and season.  In duality theory it has been well established that the cost function is an 
equally valid production technology representation as the conventional production function, or 
                                                     
6 This assumption is tested, and results are available upon request from the authors. 
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a distance function (e,g., Fare and Primont (2012)). Importantly, the use of a cost function does 
not necessarily require or imply cost minimisation. In fact, the above duality theory requires 
no a priori behavioural assumption thus allowing the model to fully capture the heterogeneous 
mix of team performance objectives (Eskelinen & Kuosmanen, 2013).  
A further challenge in modelling team performance is the feedback loop between 
revenue, player spending and sporting success (Garcia-del-Barrio & Szymanski, 2009; Leach 
& Szymanski, 2015; Szymanski & Smith, 1997). Hall, Szymanski, and Zimbalist (2002) argue 
causation runs from wages to success in English Premier teams.  In contrast, Dobson and 
Goddard (1998) find lagged revenue causes current performance for Football League teams, 
with a more pronounced effect for smaller clubs. Peeters and Szymanski (2014) control for 
unobserved player productivity using both an instrumental variable and a club specific fixed 
effect approach in their parametric contest function.  The model can accommodate these 
endogeneity issues and provide valid estimates.  Specifically, the panel data solution for the 
simultaneity problem in production modelling (Mundlak, 1961; Mundlak & Hoch, 1965) is 
extended by providing nonparametric time-varying club specific effects 𝛼𝑖𝑡
7.  These ‘catch all’ 
estimates absorb unobserved productivity and, if the feedback effect from wages to success has 
a constant variation across club’s and seasons, capture the unobservable nature of this feedback.                                                 
Modelling the Operating Environment 
The z vector captures elements of cross-club heterogeneity and temporal changes over the 
sample. The StoNEZD estimator allows for simultaneous estimation of efficiency scores and 
their decomposition as a function of environmental variables.  In doing so it controls for 
correlations between environmental variables and efficiency model outcomes (Johnson & 
Kuosmanen, 2012).   
                                                     
7 A variable returns to scale specification is used to estimate these effects. 
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The z vector includes dummy variables which control for Champions League and Europa 
league qualification.  The implications of promotion and relegation8 are modelled using two 
dummies; Promotion Push identifies a club in the year immediately preceding promotion to 
the Premier League, Relegated identifies a club relegated from the Premier League in the prior 
season.  We examine how manager turnover impacts efficiency9. A Managerial Change 
dummy identifies those seasons where there was at least one manager turnover event. A lag of 
this dummy is included to capture the inter-temporal impact of management turnover.  Stadium 
Utilisation is measured by calculating the average attendance as a proportion of stadium 
capacity each season.  Against a backdrop of higher ticket prices and increased broadcast of 
games, most clubs sampled have spare attendance capacity with this slack much more notable 
in the Championship. If the demand for tickets is price elastic, ticket price cuts have the 
capacity to simultaneously increase attendance and raise ticket revenue. This has the potential 
to raise financial efficiency by utilising existing infrastructure more intensively. If greater home 
fan attendance has a positive impact upon player productivity it may also lead to more efficient 
sporting performance of the home team. Each club’s Commercial Independence is measured 
as the proportion of revenues that come from non-central sources (i.e. those revenues that are 
not derived from central distributions from UEFA, the Premier League and the Championship).  
A set of season-tier dummies are included to capture unobservable temporal effects.   
Akin to the literature on counterfactual economic analysis of regulation (Glass, 
McKillop, & Rasaratnam, 2010) the hypothetical financial regulation conditions are imposed 
within the z vector. Following Peeters and Szymanski (2014) FFP break-even constraints are 
                                                     
8 Goddard (2014) contends the opening of competition through the promotion and relegation system creates large 
disparities between the operating environments of the two tiers. He argues this system has a detrimental effect on 
profitability, owing to the pervasive tendency to overspend to achieve promotion or avoid relegation.   
9 González‐ Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo, and García‐Rubio (2011) demonstrate that clubs who sack managers mid-
season have lower sporting efficiency in the lead up to the sacking, however replacement improves sporting 
efficiency thereafter.  Bridgewater (2009) suggests that the positive impact of manager appointment is short-lived 
and is associated with a longer term mean reversion after an initial ‘honeymoon’ period. This is echoed by Hughes, 
Hughes, Mellahi, and Guermat (2010).  
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imposed at the £15m, £10m, £5m and £5m over three consecutive seasons thresholds. Each 
threshold is calibrated using pre-tax profits in each season, and dummy variables take the value 
of one if the club’s pre-tax losses exceed the threshold value and zero otherwise. 
The StoNEZD estimator is a form of regression and therefore marginal effects can be 
extracted.  Specifically, the equality constraint from equation 2 can be rewritten: 
(3) 
 
𝛾𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖?̃?𝑡 =  ln(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) − ln(𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) 
 
𝛾𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖?̃?𝑡 =  ln (
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
) 
 
where the right-hand side is the log of cost inefficiency.  Thus, the coefficient estimates for the 
z variables can be interpreted as the marginal effects of the z variables on the log of cost 
inefficiency.   
To attach economic meaning to these marginal effects in the log-linear model the 
estimates must first be exponentiated. Furthermore, if the z variable is binary the exponentiated 
estimate corresponds to the ratio of the expected geometric means of the unlogged outcome 
variable for the two coded groups. This can be interpreted as the percentage difference in the 
geometric mean between groups. 
Data and Shadow Price Testing 
Financial statement data is sourced from the Deloitte Annual Reviews of Football Finance. 
This data is extracted from the annual financial statements of the legal entity registered in the 
UK which is at, or closest to, the top of the club ownership structure. It is adjusted to provide 
a clearer picture of the football business by extracting, where available, financial activities or 
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significant capital transactions relating to non-football activities10. To clean the Deloitte data 
the following additions and amendments were made: 
 
1. There are instances where Deloitte did not update a particular variable in a given year, 
instead incorrectly assuming stasis from the prior year. These are treated in the same 
manner as other missing data - to the maximum extent possible the correct values from 
the club’s annual report are obtained from Companies House11. 
2. Where a club had a non-standard reporting year, we extract the 12 month equivalent 
values (if reported) or otherwise rescale variables relating to accounting flows12 on a 
pro-rata basis.  
 
Financial data is augmented with sporting data sourced from the Premier and Football League’s 
websites. The full sample is an unbalanced panel representing 60 clubs spanning the 2003/2004 
to 2016/2017 seasons.  In total, there are 594 club-season observations. 
 
<<<Table 2 Here>>> 
Inputs and Outputs 
The main input factor, CostShare, is the variable cost share of the club where cost is measured 
as the total of salaries, amortisation of player registrations13 and match day expenses.  Financial 
                                                     
10 For example revenues relating to property development (e.g. Arsenal in 2013-14), travel agency (Chelsea in 
2003-04) and sale of intellectual property to related parties (e.g. Manchester City in 2013-14) have been 
excluded where identifiable 
11 If data for a given club-year is unavailable from Companies House that club-year is excluded from the 
sample.  In most cases non-filing clubs were under administration.   
12 Accounting stock variables are measured point in time and thus left unscaled. 
13 Accounting standards require the cost of acquiring a player’s registration from another club to be capitalised 
on the balance sheet within intangible fixed assets.  The capitalised amount is subsequently amortised over the 
player’s contract.   
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output is modelled as a club’s revenue share14, RevShare.  Revenue includes that generated 
from broadcasting, matchday and commercial activities.  Broadcast revenue includes both 
domestic and international competitions capturing the financial success of playing in Europe.  
Matchday revenue is largely derived from gate receipts.  Commercial revenue includes 
sponsorship, conference and catering, merchandising, licensing and other revenues.  Sporting 
output is modelled as a club’s domestic point share, PtsShare.  When assessing team efficiency 
it is important to consider the variation in the talent available (Dawson, Dobson, & Gerrard, 
2000a), thus a variable input price, TalentShare, is included to capture the variation in playing 
talent available to management. This is measured as net book value share of the playing squad. 
Tables 3 presents a snapshot of the financial data over the sample period. 
<<<Table 3 Here>>> 
A Note on Shadow Prices  
A key focus of the study is to understand the juxtaposition of a team’s sporting and financial 
objectives, and how these objectives are affected by the imposition of various levels of 
regulatory stringency.  These phenomena are investigated using shadow prices.  Shadow prices 
are a ‘virtual’ or ‘implicit’ price (Färe & Primont, 2012). They are the value of the marginal 
product faced by management based on the optimal choice of outputs and inputs which 
maximises utility (Murray, 1995).  If the management’s choices of input-output bundles are 
guided by rational economic objectives, these shadow prices reveal the underlying opportunity 
costs hidden from the researcher (Kuosmanen, Cherchye, & Sipilainen, 2006).  Importantly, 
this opportunity cost (economic price) definition can also be interpreted as marginal 
substitution (transformation) rates between inputs (outputs).  Given that the model uses unit-
                                                     
14 Considering revenue as an output is consistent with the resource-based theory of industrial efficiency 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Rumelt,  1991).  The flexibility of this theory has proven important in capturing 
the multidimensional objective of English professional football (Gerrard, 2005).   
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free share variables this offers an intuitive appealing interpretation of the shadow price 
estimates as opportunity costs.   
Equation 1 provides shadow price estimates.  Given variables enter the model in share 
form, the shadow prices highlight the economic importance to a rational manager/owner of 
capturing market share in each variable and how this importance will change with increased 
financial regulation stringency.   
Results 
Given that the StoNZED approach to efficiency analysis is a sum of squares minimisation 
problem, a regression interpretation is appropriate.  Using panel data, Eskelinen & Kousmanen 
(2013) describe how a StoNZED consistent fixed effects model can be employed. In equation 
4 the periodic deviation from the efficient frontier is measured as 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜀?̂?𝑡
𝐶𝑁𝐿𝑆), which captures 
both inefficiency and stochastic noise.  Averaging this deviation over time leads to a measure 
of the inefficiency of a club over the sample period.  Subsequently the most efficient club over 
the sample period can be identified and used as a benchmark for all others.  The efficiency 
scores are normalised as a percentage of benchmark club efficiency to produce ?̂?𝑖 efficiency 
scores bounded by [0,1].   A club with a score of 1 is operating on the efficient cost frontier.  
A club with a score less than 1 can improve their efficiency by producing the same share of 
outputs at a lower share of costs.   
?̅?𝑖 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜀?̂?𝑡
𝐶𝑁𝐿𝑆)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
?̅?𝑖
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(?̅?𝑖) 
?̂?𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖/?̅?𝑖
∗  
(4) 
 
<<<Table 4 Here>>> 
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Several noteworthy findings emerge in Table 4, which summarises efficiency by 
regulatory regime.  Firstly, as the degree of break-even regulatory scrutiny becomes more 
severe the average club becomes relatively less efficient vis-à-vis the most efficient club.  The 
cost efficiency gap between the mean (median) and most efficient club increases from around 
6.8% (9.0%) under the no FFP model to 27.8% (37.9%) under the most stringent of regulatory 
regimes.  The distribution of relative club cost efficiency (as measured by the standard 
deviation of efficiency scores) also widens significantly with increased levels of regulatory 
scrutiny. 
We investigate how the efficiency cost of the breakeven regulations are distributed 
amongst regulated clubs.  This facilitates examination of the hypothesis that the FFP 
regulations may in part have emerged because of rent seeking by politically powerful clubs in 
exerting control over the regulator. Doing so requires a classification of those clubs considered 
to be amongst the Premier Leagues elite and most powerful (domestically and internationally). 
It is noted that the FFP regulations were conceived by UEFA, a supranational regulatory entity. 
It is reasonable to assert that more successful clubs on the European stage hold more influence 
over UEFA.  These clubs qualify for Europe’s marquee club competition by finishing in the 
upper echelons of the Premier League so one could also argue that their political influence 
extends to the Premier League itself.  Since the dawn of the Premier League era (in 1992), 
English representatives in the UEFA Champions League have consisted of a narrow and select 
group. Of the 84 instances of English club representation, 66 of those come from just four 
clubs: Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea and Liverpool15.   They have traditionally been 
labelled as English football’s Big 4.  One disruptor to this dominance can be noted in the 
sample.  During the 2008-2009 season Manchester City were taken over by Sheikh Mansour 
                                                     
15 All but Arsenal won the Champions League over that period. Of the 25 Premier League seasons since its 
inception, these four clubs have won the title 21 times. 
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bin Zayed Al Nahyan. This was followed by unprecedented investment in the playing squad, 
management structure and stadium, transforming the sporting fortunes of the club.  
Consequently elite clubs are defined as the traditional Big 4 throughout the sample and 
Manchester City from 2008-2009 onwards.  Hitherto this elite group is referred to as the Big 
516. 
 Table 5 shows the change in mean efficiency for the Big 5 vis-a-vis the remaining 
clubs in the sample under the various regulatory formulations. The ‘no FFP scenario’ serves as 
a baseline.  While both groups in general experience efficiency declines with heightened 
regulatory severity, the declines are more marked for clubs outside the Big 5.  Under the most 
stringent regulatory formulation, the average efficiency loss for clubs outside the Big 5 is 
around four times that of those within. The efficiency loss gap widens as the regulations tighten.  
This suggests that despite reducing the overall efficiency of elite clubs, the regulations serve to 
entrench their financial and competitive positions vis-a-vis their domestic competitors.  This is 
consistent with other research in the area (e.g. Peeters & Szymanski 2014) and suggestive of 
the private interest rationale17 (Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971) for the emergence 
of the FFP regulation. The entrenchment of the elite clubs may also be symptomatic of an 
environment where they are deemed “too-prominent-to-fail" (Budzinski, 2014).  If regulatory 
bodies are subject to political interference they may be influenced by political interests to 
design regulation which insulates the elite (prominent) from competition. To the extent that 
                                                     
16 In addition to their status as sporting elite, the Big 5 have revenue generation capacity that far outstripped 
their domestic competitors over the sample period. Their revenue accounted for over 49.81% of Premier League 
revenue in 2016/17. 
17 An alternative explanation asserts that the introduction of FFP regulations coincides with a period of heightened 
competitive intensity to avoid relegation from and gain promotion to the Premier League.  If this is the case, lower 
levels of efficiency of clubs outside the elite may be driven by competitive dynamics rather than FFP. We proxy 
for competive intensity by calculating the Herfindahl index of points share amongst those clubs in the bottom 6 
(and 10) places in the Premier League and those in the top 6 (and 10 places) in the Championship.  We analyse 
the points required for survival in the Premier League, the gap between the first relegated and last surviving club, 
the point gap between automatic promotion and playoff places in the Championship and the point gap between 
the last club to qualify for the Championship playoffs and the first club to miss out.  We find no statistical evidence 
of heightened sporting intensity in the pre and post FFP era. The results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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owners of elite clubs exert political influence, the private interest and “too prominent to fail” 
rationales may compound. 
 <<<Table 5 Here>>> 
The methodology allows us to investigate the efficiency dynamics via output shadow 
price estimates.  Shadow prices can be interpreted as marginal costs or alternatively as relative 
importance measures in determining overall cost efficiency.  Using either interpretation, allows 
analysis of the trade-offs clubs face in pursuing financial and sporting goals in an efficient 
manner under various regulatory regimes.  Table 6 presents the mean and median of these 
shadow prices. 
<<<Table 6 Here>>> 
 
Several noteworthy findings emerge.  As break-even regulatory severity increases, the relative 
importance of capturing league revenue share increases.  The mean (median) shadow price of 
revenue share rises from 0.391 (0.422) to 0.511 (0.537), meaning that each extra incremental 
percentage of league revenue share captured comes at an increasing cost of points share, from 
0.391% (0.422%) in the non FFP regime to 0.511% (0.537%) in the most stringent regime.  
The mean (median) shadow price of points share falls from 0.342 (0.333) to 0.221 (0.201) 
meaning that each extra incremental percentage of points share captured comes at a decreasing 
cost of revenue share.  Put simply as regulatory severity increases, revenue generation becomes 
more important for efficiency while points share (sporting success) becomes less important. 
We test the significance of differences in shadow prices across regulatory regimes using 
the output ratio and standard approaches to testing group difference. The base case (no FFP) is 
compared to the various regulatory formulations.  Table 7 summarizes the tests for differences 
in the relative importance (as measured by the ratio of shadow prices) of revenue versus 
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sporting outputs. These results provide statistical evidence to corroborate the average 
differences observed in table 6.   
<<<Table 7 Here>>> 
Proponents of the FFP regulations may contend that this refocusing of football clubs 
towards revenue generation indicates that the break-even requirements of FFP are achieving 
their intended outcomes.  However, we would urge caution in making such an assertion.  The 
declining importance of sporting success in determining efficiency may in fact undermine the 
quality and competitive nature of English football.  We argue that sporting and financial 
outcomes must be considered jointly in the spirit of the regulations.  Having done so, the 
assertions are rather gloomy.  The costs associated with FFP regulations appear to offset the 
gains, leaving the average club less efficient and the distribution of efficiency outcomes wider 
under more severe regulatory regimes. 
The model permits an analysis of the drivers of inefficiency at the club level.  Table 8 
presents the results of this analysis using the simultaneous regression procedure18 .  Here the 
dependent variable, inefficiency, is modelled as a function of several explanatory variables 
which characterise the operating environment of a club.  Table 8 presents the marginal effects 
of the environmental variables.  As described in the methodology, the dummy variables have 
the intuitively appealing interpretation as the expected group difference in the geometric mean 
of a club’s inefficiency. 
<<<Table 8 Here>>> 
                                                     
18 Importantly this regression procedure is not subject to the problems of the 2 stage DEA procedure (Simar & 
Wilson, 2007) because the effects of the z variables are controlled for via simultaneous estimation of the frontier 
and the efficiency decomposing regression model.   
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Pushing for promotion to the Premier League leads to an increase in inefficiency at the 
club level (in the region of 1% to 2%).  Moreover, as the degree of regulatory severity increases 
the efficiency implications of the promotion push loom larger. The results suggest that 
relegated clubs improve their efficiency in the year post relegation, however the wide variation 
in efficiency estimates for these clubs result in marginal statistical significance across most 
regulatory formulations. 
Despite the perceived cash bounty of playing in the UEFA Champions League, clubs 
who do so are less cost efficient than those who do not. Playing in the Champions League is 
typically associated with an efficiency decline of around 4% to 5% under various levels of 
regulatory scrutiny.  This is consistent with the observation that margins of the Champions 
League regulars are thinner. Assembling and servicing a squad capable of qualifying for the 
Champions League brings with its enormous cost implications.  In addition, one could also 
assert that the imposition of playing Champions League football (where games are scheduled 
midweek) decreases levels of domestic performance lowering domestic sporting efficiency.  
Europa League competition has a much more muted impact as evidenced by either no or 
marginal statistical significance of this dummy variable across specification variants. This is 
perhaps unsurprising given that clubs competing in this competition have considerably lower 
expenditure on playing talent and salaries than those in the Champions League.  
Clubs which are more commercially independent, i.e. those whose revenues are less 
reliant on central distributions from UEFA, the Premier League and the Championship, are 
significantly more efficient, and the impact of independence on efficiency increases with the 
severity of the regulatory regime. For a one standard deviation increase in commercial 
independence (corresponding to 21.20 percentage points), efficiency increases by between 
0.46% and 0.73%. This suggests that for efficiency striving clubs, operating under breakeven 
regimes, creating diverse commercial revenue streams is of paramount importance.  
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Clubs which have greater stadium capacity utilisation rates are more efficient. For a 
one standard deviation increase in stadium capacity utilisation (corresponding to 15.80 
percentage points), efficiency increases by between 0.31% and 0.37%. It is noted that many 
clubs in the sample, particularly those in the Championship, have spare capacity.  This suggests 
that ticket pricing, fan engagement and marketing initiatives aimed at increasing stadium 
utilisation are well founded in the pursuit of efficient operation. 
Clubs which change their management have lower efficiency than those who don’t in 
the season of change, however the significance of the relation is marginal.  It is conjectured 
that the marginal significance is in part driven by declines in efficiency in the lead up to the 
change being partially offset by efficiency improvements in the ‘honeymoon’ period post 
change and prior to season end.  In the season post manager change, clubs improve their 
efficiency by between 0.66% and 1.96%.  In general, the more severe the breakeven constraint, 
the greater the efficiency impact of prior season management change. The results assert that 
club executives who decide to replace management may benefit from an arrest in efficiency 
declines and subsequent improvement in efficiency thereafter. 
Clubs defined as violators of the break-even condition under the various regulatory 
regimes are less cost efficient.  As the degree of regulatory severity increases, so too does the 
relative inefficiency of violators compared to non-violators. Clubs which violate break-even 
requirements are typically between 5% and 7% less efficient than compliant peers.  In all 
regulatory regimes, the marginal effects on the violation dummies are considerably higher than 
those relating to European club competition, promotion, relegation, commercial independence, 
stadium utility or management turnover.  
Conclusion 
This study analyses the impact of regulatory breakeven constraints (in the manner of UEFA 
and the Premier League’s Financial Fair Play regulations) on the joint financial and sporting 
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efficiency of English football clubs. The research has three main findings.  Firstly, breakeven 
constraints reduce average club efficiency.  Secondly, the reduction in club efficiency is not 
borne equally.  Clubs that may be considered as politically elite (‘the Big 5’), are handicapped 
less than their peers by the imposition of the regulation.  Thirdly, breakeven constraints serve 
to raise the relative efficiency determining importance of financial goals (capturing revenue 
share) whilst lowering the relative importance of sporting goals (capturing point share). Each 
finding is heightened under tighter regulatory formulations.  
Whilst one might conclude that the heightened importance of financial outcomes is a 
desired consequence of the regulations, it should be noted that financial efficiency gains are 
more than offset in sporting efficiency losses. As sporting efficiency captures the conversion 
of sporting input (i.e. playing talent) into sporting output (i.e. league point share), it is argued 
that any efficiency impairment reduces the quality of the sporting product.  To the extent that 
this compromises fan experience it undermines one of the stated goals of the regulations – 
namely to ‘further promote and continuously improve the standard of all aspects of football’.  
We argue that this is an unintended consequence of the regulation. 
Furthermore it is suggested that the regulations in their current form serve to protect the 
elite clubs who built their sporting and financial dynasties in the pre-FFP era.  This supports 
the private interest theory of regulation which asserts that the regulatory mechanism is a means 
for the elite to extract economic rents from the non-elite. By opening up an efficiency gap 
between these two groups, this rent extraction may undermine the long-term league viability 
and may violate EU competition laws. 
This study has implications for club management who operate under break-even based 
regulatory regimes. The greater the degree of regulatory severity, the more clubs will improve 
efficiency by allocating resources to capturing revenue share over point share.  As central 
distributions by the Premier League and Championship are relatively even at the league level, 
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the optimal strategy may thus be the pursuit of new sponsorship deals and commercial 
partnerships rather than investing in sporting talent.  The findings also suggest that club 
efficiency benefits from higher stadium capacity utilisation.  To that end ticket pricing, fan 
engagement and marketing strategies targeted at increasing attendances are valuable, and 
especially so in the Championship where capacity slack is more evident. It is noted that 
managerial turnover has a relatively muted and marginally significant impact on efficiency in 
the season of change.  However, the findings suggest that in the season post change, overall 
efficiency improves. This implies that decisions to replace management may help arrest 
efficiency declines and thus be well founded from an efficiency perspective.  We urge caution 
in chasing either promotion to the Premier League or Champions League qualification.  While 
both come with a perceived cash bounty, the costs incurred in achieving them overwhelm any 
efficiency gains.  
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
Financial Fair Play Loss Thresholds 
Regulator      Cumulative 
Regular 
Allowable Loss 
Cumulative 
Maximum 
Allowable Loss 
Assessment Period 
UEFA €5m €30m 3 rolling seasons 
The Premier League £15m £105m 3 rolling seasons 
The Championship £15m £39m 3 rolling seasons 
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TABLE 2 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
CostShare 
Cost share of club by season by tier.  Cost is measured as the total of 
salaries, amortisation of player registrations and match day expenses 
  
RevShare Revenue share of club by season by tier 
  
PtsShare Points share of club by season by tier 
  
TalentShare Net book value of player registrations share of club by season by tier 
  
BE15M_d 
Break-even constraint dummy variable. Value equals 1 if the average 
losses calculated over a three-year period are greater than £15 million, 0 
otherwise.   
  
BE10M_d 
Break-even constraint dummy variable. Value equals 1 if the average 
losses calculated over a three-year period are greater than £10 million, 0 
otherwise.   
  
BE5M_d 
Break-even constraint dummy variable. Value equals 1 if the average 
losses calculated over a three-year period are greater than £5 million, 0 
otherwise.   
  
BE5M3s_d 
Break-even constraint dummy variable. This variable takes the value 1 
if the club’s cumulative three-year losses are greater than £5 million 
and 0 otherwise.  
  
Promotion 
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the club gets promoted at the 
end of that season and 0 otherwise. 
  
Relegated 
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the club was relegated at the 
end of the prior season and 0 otherwise. 
  
CL 
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the club competed in the 
Champions League in that season, 0 otherwise 
  
EL 
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the club competed in the 
Europa League in that season, 0 otherwise 
  
Commercial 
Independence 
Revenue excluding central distributions from the domestic league and 
European competitions as a percentage of total revenue. 
  
Stadium Utility 
Average attendance for the season as a percentage of the stadium 
capacity. 
  
Manager Change 
A dummy variable taking the value one when there was a managerial 
change in that season, zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 3 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Financial Data 
 Revenue(£000)  
Season End League Mean Median StdDev Min Max Count 
2003-2004 Premier 64,769 48,763 40,793 13,928 171,500 19 
2007-2008 Premier 95,863 71,594 63,470 43,455 257,116 20 
2011-2012 Premier 117,004 78,638 81,163 52,597 320,320 20 
2016-2017 Premier 228,810 156,975 140,064 116,927 581,204 20 
2003-2004 Championship 13,756 9,018 11,263 4,119 39,633 23 
2007-2008 Championship 14,026 12,146 7,104 4,786 32,648 24 
2011-2012 Championship 20,005 17,760 9,918 8,279 46,899 22 
2016-2017 Championship 30,776 23,752 20,705 11,486 85,685 23 
 Costs(£000)  
2003-2004 Premier 53,407 44,514 36,934 13,255 170,716 19 
2007-2008 Premier 78,950 59,292 49,008 34,386 229,377 20 
2011-2012 Premier 106,160 76,468 69,341 39,732 284,820 20 
2016-2017 Premier 169,957 134,308 97,696 83,548 385,875 20 
2003-2004 Championship 10,418 8,376 7,689 2,542 28,489 23 
2007-2008 Championship 14,389 13,808 7,511 3,521 31,539 24 
2011-2012 Championship 21,067 20,311 10,608 6,153 51,419 22 
2016-2017 Championship 37,505 30,563 30,499 1,251 147,940 23 
 Net Book Value of Player Registrations (£000)  
2003-2004 Premier 28,569 17,754 36,088 783 153,236 19 
2007-2008 Premier 49,526 39,560 39,304 8,880 154,691 20 
2011-2012 Premier 56,617 25,691 64,257 5,472 226,244 20 
2016-2017 Premier 115,404 94,314 85,912 16,346 333,908 20 
2003-2004 Championship 1,820 684 2,691 13 8,968 23 
2007-2008 Championship 4,603 3,780 3,931 319 17,094 24 
2011-2012 Championship 4,314 2,400 5,248 192 17,924 22 
2016-2017 Championship 18,272 9,321 24,246 398 93,500 23 
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Panel B: Summary Statistics for Other Variables 
Combined Across All Sample Years For Both Premier League and Championship Clubs 
Variable Mean Median StdDev Min Max Count 
BE15M_d 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 594 
BE10M_d 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 594 
BE5M_d 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 594 
BE5M3s_d 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 594 
Promotion 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 594 
Relegated 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 594 
CL 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 594 
EL 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 594 
Commercial Independence 0.58 0.60 0.21 0.00 1.00 594 
Stadium Utility 0.81 0.82 0.16 0.41 1.00 594 
Manager Change 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 594 
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TABLE 4  
Descriptive Statistics of Cost Efficiency Scores by Regulatory Regime 
Model Mean Std Dev Median Min Max 
No FFP 0.932 0.098 0.910 0.614 1 
BE15M 0.891 0.111 0.841 0.588 1 
BE10M 0.833 0.119 0.816 0.572 1 
BE5M 0.763 0.131 0.699 0.499 1 
BE5M3s 0.722 0.147 0.621 0.414 1 
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TABLE 5 
Comparative Efficiency Analysis of the Big 5 vs Other Clubs 
Group  Model Mean Std Dev Wilcoxon Mann 
Whitney rank sum 
z-test 
Efficiency Loss  
(relative to NoFFP 
Model) 
Big5  NoFFP 0.9650 0.0900 
1.70* 
 
Others   0.8810 0.1110  
       
Big5  BE15M 0.9210 0.0770 
2.21** 
4.40% 
Others   0.8010 0.0608 8.00% 
       
Big5  BE10M 0.9210 0.1082 
2.00** 
4.40% 
Others   0.7350 0.0739 14.60% 
       
Big5  BE5M 0.9070 0.1124 
4.99*** 
5.80% 
Others   0.6212 0.0903 25.98% 
       
Big5  BE5M3s 0.8950 0.1295 
7.77*** 
7.00% 
Others   0.6010 0.1065 28.00% 
Notes: *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.  
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TABLE 6  
Summary of StoNZED Shadow Prices 
  Mean Median 
Model Revenue Share Points Share Revenue Share Points Share 
No FFP 0.391 0.342 0.422 0.333 
BE15M 0.416 0.315 0.429 0.310 
BE10M 0.439 0.282 0.451 0.276 
BE5M 0.491 0.259 0.507 0.240 
BE5M3s 0.511 0.221 0.537 0.201 
Notes: These estimates can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of the output that was 
sacrificed in pursuit of an increase in the other output 
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TABLE 7  
Group Comparison Tests for Shadow Prices 
Model Equality of Variance 
F-test 
Wilcoxon Mann 
Whitney rank sum z-
test 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov equality of 
distribution D-test 
BE15M 421.12*** 5.41*** 0.89*** 
BE10M 321.14*** 5.13*** 1.37*** 
BE5M 511.91*** 7.65*** 1.56*** 
BE5M3s 444.21*** 6.81*** 1.44*** 
Notes:  *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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TABLE 8 
Marginal Effects of Environmental Variables 
Model No FFP BE15M BE10M BE5M BE5M3s 
Promotion Push 1.03%*** 1.06%*** 1.31%*** 2.12%** 2.21%*** 
Relegation -1.49%* -2.15%* -2.19%** -2.98%* -3.51%* 
CL 4.25%*** 4.37%** 4.99%** 5.16%** 5.16%** 
EL 1.51%* 1.62% 1.66% 1.50%* 1.51%* 
Commercial 
Independence 
-2.19%** -2.89%*** -3.11%*** -3.14%*** -3.42%*** 
Stadium Utility -1.18%*** -1.39%*** -1.48%*** -1.78%*** -2.21%*** 
Manager Change 1.22%* 1.79%** 1.91%** 1.71%*** 1.51%*** 
Manager Change(t-1) -0.66%*** -0.88%** -1.47%*** -1.61%** -1.96%*** 
BE15M_d  5.21%***    
BE10M_d   6.11%**   
BE5M_d    6.75%***  
BE5M3s_d     7.29%** 
Observations 594 594 594 594 594 
Partial R2 0.981 0.991 0.994 0.994 0.993 
Notes: This table shows the marginal effects of the coefficients from the estimation of equation 
3 transformed by exponentiating to provide direct economic interpretation. Season/Tier 
dummies are included on all models but excluded from table 8 for brevity *** p<0.01; 
**p<0.05; *p<0.1.  
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